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Abstract
We design two mechanisms for the recommender system to collect user ratings. One is
modified Laplace mechanism, and the other is randomized response mechanism. We prove that
they are both differentially private and preserve the data utility.
1 Introduction
Recommender Systems (RS) [1] are a kind of system that seek to recommend to users what they
are likely interested in. Unlike search engines, the users do not need to type any keyword. The RS’s
will learn their interest automatically. For instance, if the user has just bought a numeric camera,
the RS will recommend to him some SD memory cards; if a user watches a lot of action movies,
the RS may suggest some other action movies to him. And this is the typical behaviors which we
observe universally in Netflix (movies), Youtube (videos), Google Play (apps), Facebook (friends),
Amazon (goods) and other platforms today.
One may wonder how it works. Let us take Netflix as an example. Netflix has a mechanism that
allows every user to rate the movies they have watched. Based on these ratings, Netflix builds a
profile for each user. And there should be quite a few methods to predict the user preference on
other movies that the user has yet seen. Readers can learn more in Section 3. This is not the main
topic of this article.
The issue addressed in this article is whether user privacy is compromised by the rating collection
mechanism, and what we may do to prevent it. In 2006, Netflix published 100 480 507 ratings
that 480 189 users gave to 17 770 movies on the Internet to hold the Netflix Prize competition
[2]. The data are anonymous. However, in 2007, two researchers from the University of Texas, de-
anonymized some of the Netflix data by matching the data set with movie ratings on the Internet
Movie Database [3]. This aroused big privacy concern. In 2009, four Netflix users filed a lawsuit
against Netflix. We see that this concern of privacy leak is real, and the anonymization alone is not
sufficient to prevent it.
Let us take a close look. There were actually two privacy leaks during the procedure. Firstly,
the users leaked their ratings to the service provider Netflix. Then, Netflix leaked the ratings to
the public. Users made a big fuss on the second leak, but they overlooked the fact that it was
themselves who leaked the ratings to Netflix at the first place. Usually, all legal companies will
ask the users to sign a user agreement, which authorizes the companies to collect user data and to
use them for certain purposes. However, almost no users will ever read it. Anyway, if they do not
agree, they will not be able to use the service.
Hence, the goal of this article is to minimize the privacy leak but still guaranteeing the functionality
of the service provider. We will achieve this goal by building differential privacy (DP) into the rating
collection mechanism. The concept of DP will be explained in detail in Section 2. The big idea is
that the user ratings are transformed through the rating collection mechanism, so that from the
output (transformed ratings), one cannot know for sure what the input (original ratings) is. Of
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
08
40
2v
1 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  2
8 A
pr
 20
16
course, this kind of transform should satisfy certain properties. After this transform, the service
provider can do whatever they want with the ratings without worrying about privacy leak. They
can either analyze it themselves, or subcontract the work to a third party by giving them the data
access. It is also possible for Netflix to hold a second competition.
One trivial transform is to transform every rating to zero or pure random number. This absolutely
prevents any privacy leak, but it erases all information contained in the data as well. Therefore,
when we build DP into the mechanism, we should be careful in order to preserve as much information
as possible in the data. We designed two mechanisms. One is modified Laplace mechanism, and the
other is randomized response mechanism (Section 2). We will show that they preserve the utility
of the ratings (Section 3).
Related work
[4] also tries to bring DP to RS. Their method is different from ours. Let Xi be the original
rating set of the i-th user, S be some aggregation statistic of ratings, A be some algorithm to do
data analysis, and f be some transform that guarantees DP. Their method can be summarized
as A (f (S (⊗ni=1Xi))) , while our method, with a little abuse of notation, can be summarized as
A (S (⊗ni=1f (Xi))).
Note that we changed the position of the transform f . This modification is of significant advantage.
In their method, f should be adapted to each statistic S, and they can only use algorithms A relying
on S. In our method, we can generalize it to A (⊗ni=1f (Xi)), which means that we can use more
types of algorithms. Furthermore, as long as f is “conjugate” (i.e. f does not change the space
where Xi is in), all previous successful algorithms could be seamlessly “transplanted”. And we will
illustrate in Section 3 that this transplantation is also seamless in theoretical guarantee.
When giving it a second thought, their method is neither privacy preserved nor meaningful. Ac-
cording to their method, at the moment where users transfer their ratings to the service provider so
that it could calculate the statistic S, user privacy has already leaked to the service provider. Then,
the service provider sends a differentially private version of recommendation back to the user. But
why the user bothers to protect the privacy against himself?!
2 Mechanisms
In this section, we will first introduce the concept of differential privacy. Then we will define the
modified Laplace mechanism and randomized response mechanism. Throughout this section, we
consider the rating vector of a single user: x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), where n is the number of items.
Note that the components may have missing values.
2.1 Differentially private mechanism
The concept of DP is not some entity lurking in the data, but it is used to describe a certain type
of data releasing mechanism. The original idea is introduced in [5]. Since, dozens of formulations
came out. We use the simplest formulation here.
Definition 1. Let  be a positive value, a random applicationM : R −→ S is called -differentially
private mechanism if
Pr (M (y) ∈ S) ≤ exp () Pr (M (z) ∈ S) ,
for any y, z ∈ R and any S ⊂ S.
The idea is that the distributions produced by y and z are absolutely continuous to each other with
the multiplier exp (). With  close to 0, these two distributions should look similar, and it will
be quite difficult to infer whether it is y or z. When it comes to the rating vector, it should be
Pr
(M (x(1)) ∈ S) ≤ exp () Pr (M (x(2)) ∈ S), where x(1) and x(2) are two different rating vectors,
which may represent two different users. Hence, the outputs of all users are mixed up and thus
indistinguishable.
2
2.2 Modified Laplace mechanism
In this subsection, we introduce modified Laplace mechanism. The name comes from Laplace
mechanism [5], which works only on continuous metrizable space. In order to handle missing value,
we will modify it a bit. For convenience, we suppose that the data are normalized into the interval
[−1, 1], and let the question mark ? denote the missing value.
Definition 2. For any  ≥ 0, ξ ∼ Laplace(0, 2 ) is a random variable, and ζ ∼ Bernoulli( exp(/2)exp(/2)+1 )
is a random variable independent to ξ. A modified Laplace mechanismM (x) = (M (x1) ,M (x2) , . . . ,M (xn))
is defined as
M (xi) =
{
ζ · (xi + ξ) + (1− ζ) ·? : xi ∈ [−1, 1]
ζ·? + (1− ζ) · ξ : xi =? , (1)
where by convention, 1·? =?, 0·? = 0 and ? + 0 =?.
The idea is that besides adding Laplace noise, we randomly remove and create some ratings as well.
This mechanism can be proven to be differentially private.
Theorem 1. Modified Laplace mechanism is n-differentially private.
2.3 Randomized response mechanism
In this subsection, we present randomized response mechanism, which works on discrete data. Note
that [6, 7] also use this term, and their definitions are even different between them. Our use of this
term is closer to [7], and we will adapt it to rating data.
Recommender systems rarely allow users to give continuous ratings. Instead, they often ask the
user to rate an item by one to five stars. These ratings are surely ordinal, but we just ignore the
order of the set. Along with the missing rating, we consider them as cardinal numbers. In the
following definition, the number 0 can be seen as the missing rating, and the numbers 1, 2, . . . , d
can be seen as the number of stars.
Definition 3. Let W = {0, 1, 2, ..., d} be a set of finite cardinality. For any  ≥ 0, any i ∈ W
, ξi is a (independent) random variable with support on W whose probability mass function is
defined by pi (j) =
exp()I(j=i)
exp()+d , for any j ∈ W . A randomized response mechanism M (x) =
(M (x1) ,M (x2) , . . . ,M (xn)) is defined asM (xk) = ξxk .
The idea is that the transformed ratings (including missing ratings) will most likely remain the
same as the original ratings, but there is still possibility that they are transformed to other ratings
(with equal probability). One can prove that this mechanism is differentially private.
Theorem 2. Randomized response mechanism is n-differentially private.
3 Utility
A natural question is that whether the transformed ratings are useful. If the transformed ratings
produce nonsense, then there will be no meaning of this transform although the user privacy is
protected. This question can be decomposed into two subquestions: what the usefulness means and
what could be the possible way to make it useful. For the first question, we will use the statistical
estimation framework. And for the second one, we will use the low-rank matrix completion method.
We start with the framework. There are m users and n items in the universe. Θm×n is the unknown
matrix of true ratings that each user will give to each item. This is a dense matrix without any
missing values. However, since there are so many items, users are not able to test every item and
their ratings are corrupted by noise. What we finally observe is a sparse matrix Xm×n, which could
be regarded as some approximation of Θ. Then, we apply either of our mechanism on X to generate
the transformed rating matrix Zm×n. Since our mechanism is computed elementwisely, this can be
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Figure 1: Rating generating process
done locally at each user’s computer. After that, each user sends their transformed rating vector to
the service provider, who observes the matrix Z. The service provider’s goal is to recover Θ from
Z.
Now we will show how it is possible to recover Θ from Z instead of from X. As mentioned in
Section 1, there are quite a few methods. Interesting readers can refer to [1, 8]. Here we will only
present one method, but the analysis can be generalized to all methods.
This method is low-rank matrix completion. We suppose Θ is a low-rank matrix, i.e. rank(Θ) =
r  min(m,n). If the true rating matrix is low-rank, then we are able to approximately recover it
with a few corrupted ratings under certain condition such as restricted isometry property (RIP) [9].
Definition 4. Let ΩZ denote the support of the non-missing ratings of Z. A projection operator
PΩZ satisfies restricted isometry property if it obeys
(1− α) ‖A‖2F ≤ 1p ‖PΩZ (A)‖2F ≤ (1 + α) ‖A‖2F , (2)
for any matrix A with sufficiently small rank and α ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small, where p is the
proportion of non-missing values of Z and ‖·‖F is the Frobenius norm.
The recover process is described as follow. Suppose that
ρ := ‖PΩZ (Θ− Z)‖F <∞. (3)
Our estimator Θˆ is obtained from the following optimization problem
arg min
M
‖M‖∗
s.t. ‖PΩZ (M − Z)‖F ≤ ρ,
(4)
where ‖·‖∗ is the nuclear norm (a.k.a. trace norm).
Under low-rank hypothesis and RIP, [9] proved∥∥∥Θˆ−Θ∥∥∥
F
≤ C0p−1/2ρ (5)
for some numerical constant C0. This means that the estimation error on the whole matrix is
proportional to the error on the support of the observed matrix, which means that the recover
method enjoys a kind of stability against the noise quantified by ρ. Of course, this noise includes
not only the noise intrinsic in the problem (i.e. between Θ and X) but also the noise artificially
introduced through the mechanism (i.e. between X and Z). We see how easily the traditional
analysis techniques can be seamlessly transplanted to the new setting.
What remains is just to give an upper bound of ρ. Let ΩX denote the support of the non-missing
ratings ofX, and s := |ΩX | be the number of non-missing ratings. Suppose that ‖PΩX (Θ−X)‖F ≤
ρ0
√
s < ∞, for some small constant ρ0. This hypothesis is quite realistic. Indeed, this is what we
need if we want to recover Θ from the untransformed ratings X. Then we have the following
theorems.
Theorem 3. Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be the level of tolerance. With probability at least 1−γ, the Z generated
by modified Laplace mechanism satisfies
ρ ≤ ρ0
√
s+
4

√
s
γ
+
√
2mn
(e

2 + 1)γ
(
1 +
8
2
)
; (6)
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with probability at least 1− γ, the Z generated by randomized response mechanism satisfies
ρ ≤ ρ0
√
s+ 2(d− 1)
√
2mnd
(e + d)γ
. (7)
When the privacy parameter  increases toward infinity, the above upper bounds decrease toward
ρ0
√
s. This means that the less the level of differential privacy is, the more accurate the data are
and then the more precise estimation we will have. This is intuitive, since the larger  is, the less
extra noise we introduce into the data. In practice, it is desirable to choose an  which makes the
entire upper bound match the order of ρ0
√
s. Combining these bounds with (5), we assure the
utility of our transformed ratings.
4 Proof
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. According to the values of (x, y) and S, we should divide it into nine cases. We only consider
non empty set of S, since the empty set case is trivial.
i) (x, y) ∈ [−1, 1]2 and S ∈ R([−1, 1])
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 1, x+ ξ1 ∈ S)
Pr(ζ2 = 1, y + ξ2 ∈ S)
=
Pr(ζ1 = 1) Pr(x+ ξ1 ∈ S)
Pr(ζ2 = 1) Pr(y + ξ2 ∈ S)
=
Pr(x+ ξ1 ∈ S)
Pr(y + ξ2 ∈ S)
≤ e.
ii) (x, y) ∈ [−1, 1]2 and S = {?}
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 0)
Pr(ζ2 = 0)
= 1 ≤ e.
iii) (x, y) ∈ [−1, 1]2 and S is more than {?}
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 1, x+ ξ1 ∈ S) + Pr(ζ1 = 0)
Pr(ζ2 = 1, y + ξ2 ∈ S) + Pr(ζ2 = 0) ≤ e
.
iv) x ∈ [−1, 1], y =?, and S ∈ R([−1, 1])
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 1, x+ ξ1 ∈ S)
Pr(ζ2 = 0, ξ2 ∈ S)
=
Pr(ζ1 = 1) Pr(x+ ξ1 ∈ S)
Pr(ζ2 = 0) Pr(ξ2 ∈ S)
≤ e 2 · e 2
= e.
v) x ∈ [−1, 1], y =?, and S = {?}
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Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 0)
Pr(ζ2 = 1)
= e−

2 ≤ e.
vi) x ∈ [−1, 1], y =? and S is more than {?}
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 1, x+ ξ1 ∈ S) + Pr(ζ1 = 0)
Pr(ζ2 = 0, ξ2 ∈ S) + Pr(ζ2 = 1) ≤ e
.
vii) y ∈ [−1, 1], x =?, and S ∈ R([−1, 1])
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 0, ξ1 ∈ S)
Pr(ζ2 = 1, y + ξ2 ∈ S)
=
Pr(ζ1 = 0) Pr(ξ1 ∈ S)
Pr(ζ2 = 1) Pr(y + ξ2 ∈ S)
≤ e− 2 · e 2
≤ e.
viii) y ∈ [−1, 1], x =?, and S = {?}
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 1)
Pr(ζ2 = 0)
= e

2 ≤ e.
ix) y ∈ [−1, 1], x =? and S is more than {?}
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
Pr(ζ1 = 0, ξ1 ∈ S) + Pr(ζ1 = 1)
Pr(ζ2 = 1, y + ξ2 ∈ S) + Pr(ζ2 = 0) ≤ e
.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. For any (x, y) ∈W 2, we have
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) =
∑
s∈S Pr(M(x) = s)∑
s∈S Pr(M(y) = s)
. (8)
s could be three kinds of values: x, y and the other. So we divide it into three cases.
i) s = x
Pr(M(x) = x)
Pr(M(y) = x) =
e
e+d
1
e+d
= e.
ii) s = y
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(y) = y) =
1
e+d
e
e+d
= e− ≤ e.
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iii) s 6= x and s 6= y
Pr(M(x) = s)
Pr(M(y) = s) =
1
e+d
1
e+d
= 1 ≤ e.
So in either way, the fraction is no more than e. Join these equations into (8), we get
Pr(M(x) ∈ S)
Pr(M(y) ∈ S) ≤
∑
s∈S Pr(M(y) = s)e∑
s∈S Pr(M(y) = s)
= e.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Firstly, we decompose 3 into three terms.
‖PΩZ (Θ− Z)‖F =
∥∥PΩZ∩ΩX (Θ−X) + PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z) + PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥F
≤ ‖PΩZ∩ΩX (Θ−X)‖F + ‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖F +
∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥F .
The first term
‖PΩZ∩ΩX (Θ−X)‖F ≤ ‖PΩX (Θ−X)‖F ≤ ρ0
√
s.
Then, we calculate the mathematical expectation of the square of the second term.
E ‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖2F = E
 ∑
(i,j)∈ΩZ∩ΩX
(Xij − Zij)2

= E
E
 ∑
(i,j)∈ΩZ∩ΩX
(Xij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ

= E
 ∑
(i,j)∈ΩZ∩ΩX
E
[
(Xij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ
] .
(9)
In the same way, we also calculate for the third term.
E
∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥2F = E
 ∑
(i,j)∈ΩZ\ΩX
(Θij − Zij)2

= E
E
 ∑
(i,j)∈ΩZ\ΩX
(Θij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ

= E
 ∑
(i,j)∈ΩZ\ΩX
E
[
(Θij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ
] .
(10)
For modified Laplace mechanism
E
[
(Xij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ
]
= 2
(
2

)2
=
8
2
, ∀i, j ∈ ΩX ∩ ΩZ ;
E
[
(Θij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ
]
= Θ2ij + 2
(
2

)2
≤ 1 + 8
2
, ∀i, j ∈ ΩZ\ΩX .
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Join these into (9) and (10), we get
E ‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖2F ≤
8s
2
E
∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥2F ≤ mne 2 + 1
(
1 +
8
2
)
,
where s := |ΩX |.
Then,
Pr
(
‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖F >
√
16s
2γ
)
≤ E ‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖
2
F
16s
2γ
=
γ
2
Pr
(∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥F >
√
2mn
(e

2 + 1)γ
(
1 +
8
2
))
≤ E
∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥2F
2mn
(e

2 +1)γ
(
1 + 82
) = γ
2
.
Finally, we have
Pr
(
‖PΩZ (Θ− Z)‖F ≤ ρ0
√
s+
4

√
s
γ
+
√
2mn
(e

2 + 1)γ
(
1 +
8
2
))
≥ 1− γ.
For randomized response mechanism
E
[
(Xij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ
] ≤ (d− 1)2 d
e + d
, ∀i, j ∈ ΩX ∩ ΩZ ;
E
[
(Θij − Zij)2|ΩX ,ΩZ
]
= (d− 1)2, ∀i, j ∈ ΩZ\ΩX .
Join these into (9) and (10), we get
E ‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖2F ≤ (d− 1)2
sd
e + d
,
E
∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥2F ≤ mnde + d (d− 1)2,
where s := |ΩX |.
Then,
Pr
(
‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖F >
√
2sd(d− 1)2
(e + d)γ
)
≤ E ‖PΩZ∩ΩX (X − Z)‖
2
F
2sd(d−1)2
(e+d)γ
=
γ
2
Pr
(∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥F >
√
2mnd(d− 1)2
(e + d)γ
)
≤ E
∥∥PΩZ\ΩX (Θ− Z)∥∥2F
2mnd(d−1)2
(e+d)γ
=
γ
2
.
Finally, since s ≤ mn, we have
Pr
(
‖PΩZ (Θ− Z)‖F ≤ ρ0
√
s+ 2(d− 1)
√
2mnd
(e + d)γ
)
≥ 1− γ.
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